Transnational Policy Networks in Global Water Governance in India by Asthana, Vandana, Ph.D.
Journal of International and Global Studies 
Volume 5 Number 1 Article 4 
11-1-2013 
Transnational Policy Networks in Global Water Governance in 
India 
Vandana Asthana Ph.D. 
Eastern Washington University, vasthana@ewu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lindenwood.edu/jigs 
 Part of the Anthropology Commons, Critical and Cultural Studies Commons, Environmental Studies 
Commons, and the Sociology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Asthana, Vandana Ph.D. (2013) "Transnational Policy Networks in Global Water Governance in India," 
Journal of International and Global Studies: Vol. 5 : No. 1 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lindenwood.edu/jigs/vol5/iss1/4 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Digital Commons@Lindenwood University. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of International and Global Studies by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons@Lindenwood University. For more information, please contact phuffman@lindenwood.edu. 
 
 
Transnational Policy Networks in Global Water Governance in India 
 
 
Vandana Asthana, PhD  
Government Department 










This paper argues that in the processes of global water governance, transnational policy 
networks play a significant role in defining spaces of engagement that privilege certain 
voices and versions. These networks produce narratives that not only convey storylines of 
sustainable water practices but also often have embedded within them the advocacy of a 
particular policy instrument that they intend to promote. What appears as knowledge is 
often structured towards the goal at which it is directed. Using application of private 
sector participation in water as an example from India, the paper explores how these 
power/knowledge regimes are established and supported and how transnational policy 
networks contribute to the change.  
 
  





Knowledge of public policy is socially relevant and forms an important agenda for the 
democratic functioning of a nation. In order to understand policy that so greatly affects and touches the 
daily lives of millions of people, it is important not just to know about public policy in theory but also 
to understand (a) the processes of policy-making and how, specifically, policies are negotiated and (b) 
why particular types of knowledge, practices, and values are established in policy. While the 
predominant area of theorization in public policy and water governance has focused on the linear 
model of planned intervention, there has been little theorization regarding the overlap of policy 
pressures associated with the sorts of complex, multi-scalar policy production processes and networks 
that have resulted from globalization and the rescaling of the state (Asthana, 2009). These policy-
networks are bound by their discourses that highlight the ways in which particular uses of water come 
to gain legitimacy. My purpose in examining these networks is not to adjudicate or draw conclusions 
about how diverse objectives of market efficiency in water and justice can be best achieved. Rather, I 
aim to emphasize the contingency and mutability of positioning of actors, not as an outcome of 
unfettered individual choice, but as it is configured within the continuous interplay of culture, history 
and power. 
The privatization of water is a keenly contested issue in an economically liberalizing India. 
Since the 1990s, large social groups across India’s diverse and disparate communities have been re-
negotiating their cultural relationship with each other according to whether they support or oppose 
privatization water policy reforms affecting the urban water supply.  It is therefore imperative to 
understand how particular ways of thinking about water gained ascendancy and came to determine the 
frame through which water is defined, measured, and tackled. The task here is to understand how 
political interests, policy entrepreneurs, and external factors led India to retreat from the 
implementation of vast bodies of regulatory controls and public management policies that have 
prevailed for decades and move toward a fundamentally different way of perceiving the role that 
government should play in the critical task of providing water to its population. This paper analyzes 
the role of transnational policy networks in determining the way water is positioned amongst these 
networks and how knowledge produced in the process became constituted as useful, hegemonic and 
legitimate.  
 
Transnational Policy Networks 
 
 There is a growing convergence within the discipline of political science on the role and 
importance of transnational policy networks (TPNs) in global public policy. A variety of terms are used 
to address the actors that form the umbrella term TPNs including “international civil servants” (Weiss, 
1982); “supranational bureaucrats” (Held & Keoning, 2004, p. 128); lateral bureaucrats (Shastri, 
1991); epistemic communities (Haas, 1992); and transnational advocacy coalitions (Keck-Sikkink, 
1987). TPNs form one of the mechanisms of global public policy whether they are addressed as 
partnerships or alliances or whether they refer simply to a forum within which to achieve a common 
goal (Stone, 2008). Global policy processes may look distinguishable from national and 
intergovernmental processes, but they remain deeply interconnected through these networks. Risse-
Kappen (1995, p. 3) defines transnational policy networks as a group of public and/or private 
organizations in which at least one organization does not operate on behalf of a national government or 
intergovernmental entity. These networks have become an attractive approach for solving a number of 
public policy challenges in the context of globalization.  They are the carriers of ideas, standards, and 





policy practices. These actors within these networks are connected by significant levels of interactions 
across national boundaries and participate in policy design and implementation. Says Stone (2008), 
“Actors within transnational policy networks include various types of public and private organizations, 
including interest groups, subnational governments, state agencies, and international secretariats. 
Networks generally are grouped for a certain issue-area but may vary in their saliency during different 
phases of the policy process” (p. 6). This paper reviews those network processes that construct 
rationalities of how relations of dominance are structured and reproduced in implementing urban water 
reform. Water is the lens through which this examination takes place in a globalizing country like 
India, which serves as a microcosm for many developing countries in which neoclassical economics 




This paper draws on Foucault’s understanding of power/knowledge and discourse.  According 
to Foucault, power is everywhere, embodied in discourse, knowledge, and “regimes of truth” 
(Foucault, 1991). These regimes of truth result from scientific understanding and institutions and are 
reinforced by political and economic ideologies, forms of media, and education systems. As such, 
power is constituted through forms of knowledge, scientific discourse, and truth. In turn, knowledge of 
“Policy” is informed by ideological considerations and often codifies morality by functioning as a 
Foucaldian “political technology,”1 which masks the political origins of power and the relations of 
power that it  helps to reproduce (Shore & Wright, 1997, p. 29).  Political technologies, according to 
Dreyfus and Rainbow (1982, p. 196), are “[advanced] by taking what is essentially a political problem, 
removing it from the realm of political discourse, and recasting it in the neutral language of science.” 
This has important implications for the ways in which information and knowledge about water come to 
be represented in the global water governance process, which relies on the versions of experts, 
institutional networks, and techniques that create and define the category “water.”  Drawing on this 
approach, this paper looks at how networks of power create and perpetuate a discourse about urban 
water policy and how this discourse is normalized in practice. 
 
Global Water Governance and TPNs 
 
 Although the concept of global governance2 is still being negotiated, there is general 
acceptance of the fact that global domains require governance—or the formulation and applications of 
rules applied by political institutions that aim to coordinate and control independent and 
interdependent relations. Such governance may be formal, informal, strict, loose, permanent, transitory, 
public or private. The recognition of water as an issue of governance was first stated at the Second 
World Water Forum in the Hague, in 2000. Water governance refers to the range of political, social, 
economic and administrative systems that are in place to regulate the development and management of 
water resources and provisions of water services delivery at different levels of society.  One of the first 
efforts to internationalize water issues began with the Mar del Plata UN conference in 1977.  This was 
followed by the Dublin Principles that set up an agenda for water to be governed on a global scale and 
where water was recognized for the first time as an economic good. The Global Water Partnership 
(GWP) Framework for Action stated that the water crisis is often a crisis of governance (emphasis 
added) that is characterized by a failure to value3 water properly and by a lack of transparency and 
accountability in the management of water. The 2000 Hague Ministerial Declaration reinforced the 
view and called for the wise governing of water to ensure good governance and so that the 
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involvement of the public and the interests of all stakeholders are included in the management of water 
resources. At the 2001 Fresh Water Conference in Bonn, the ministers proposed that each country 
should (a) have in place applicable arrangements for governance of water at all levels and, where 
appropriate, should (b) prioritize and accelerate water sector reforms.  The World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in 2002 endorsed the development of water management strategies at 
regional, national, and local levels that promote both equitable access to water and adequate supplies 
of water. It also mentioned that water privatization is the best way to tackle the developing worlds’ 
poverty and water delivery problems.   
  The process of the privatization of water began during the international debt crisis of the 
1980s,4 during which structural adjustment programs of the World Bank (WB) and International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) forced developing countries to denationalize their public enterprises. By the 
1990s, even the most essential public services like the provision of water and sanitation were brought 
under the purview of the neoliberal logic of privatization (Goldman, 2007). An era of global water 
networks began in the 1990s with the formation of the World Water Council, the World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, and The Global Water Partnership in the 21st century. With the 
addition of the World Commission for Water, the goal of these networks became the integration of 
water into the new world economy. These water organizations or think tanks have a phenomenal 
degree of private sector participation in the creation, financing, and management of water. However, 
the multiplicity of these institutions masks the reality that water effectively remains controlled by a 
very small handful of influential corporations and the World Bank. Key officials of the Bank 
participate in these networks. European firms like Suez, one of the world’s largest water companies, 
the UN, and well-connected heads of think tanks and NGOs (like Water–Aid and IUCN, which share 
the Bank’s ideology) also form part of the network (Goldman 2007). The World Bank has played an 
important role in sustaining and constituting these networks at global policy forums.  Training, 
seminars, workshops, education, and media dissemination of knowledge are key to the global water 
policy network in order to build a consensus on water policy reform. Some of the themes emanating 
out of these networks include (a) the agreement that there is a crisis in water availability and that the 
poor are the greatest sufferers; (b) the understanding that the lack of access to adequate water is often a 
result of poor management practices that must be corrected through efficient public private 
partnerships, with pricing and cost recovery as a key goal (c) the understanding that water is a public 
good, with social and economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as such5,  (d) 
an agreement that water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners, stakeholders and policy-makers at all levels; and, finally, (e) a consensus that 
integrated water resources management is based on the equitable and efficient management and 
sustainable use of water. 
 
TPNs, Knowledge Production and Transformation of Water Policy in India 
 
The pace at which neoliberalism6 circulated at a global level in the 1990s and the dominance 
that neoliberal ideology demonstrated over global markets had important consequences for water at the 
national level in India. The discourse of globalization asserted that water was to be distributed by 
mechanisms of the market. Wolf (2003) notes, “Over the last 20 years, no global water policy meeting 
has neglected to pass a resolution which, among other [things], defines water as an ‘economic good’” 
(p. 174). While policy shifts towards the privatization and commercialization of water services in 
developed economies are often based on national decisions and regulations, developing countries are 
increasingly subject to international commitments compelling the implementation of privatization 





measures. The IMF, the World Bank, and the regional development banks have played a key role in the 
restructuring of public-owned services, including the privatization of the water sector in low-income 
countries as a condition of loan granting and debt relief. For example, the IMF in India, for its part, 
wanted India, during its financial crisis in 1991,7 to undertake fiscal consolidation by agreeing to a set 
of terms that would go along with its stabilization and structural adjustment program, including the 
reduction of fiscal deficits, balancing of the national budget, cutting subsidies, and increasing food and 
fertilizer prices. In fact, the Indian national budget of 1991-1992 had to cut expenditures drastically, 
and the axe fell on both social sectors and capital expenditures (Nayar, 2001).  
 Until the late 1980s, the Central Government of India had allocated state support for water 
governance and considered urban water management and delivery to be solely the responsibility of 
individual states. Since the 1990s, as economic liberalization gained momentum, there has been a shift 
in the understanding of water management; water and its governance have become part of the national 
infrastructure, and the reform in water management practices with the help of the private sector is 
considered an essential component for national development and growth. This shift in policy has been 
a consequence of the multiscalar pressures exerted by TPNs. The following section discusses some of 
the major policy-networks and their role in the transformation of urban water policy. 
 
The World Bank and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs) 
 
With an extensive knowledge network in and outside of India, the World Bank emphasizes 
three strategic principles that underpin its work in the country: “(a) focusing on outcomes (b) applying 
selectivity and (c) acting as a knowledge provider (WB Country Strategy for India 2005-2008 in 
Dharmadhikary, 2008, p. 6). The Bank’s India Country Assistance Strategy8, 2001 mentioned: 
The Bank Group will employ various tools to develop and disseminate knowledge: from 
short pieces of sector work to formal pieces of analytical and advisory work, technical 
assistance, conferences and workshops. Workshops and conferences, to be organized in 
collaboration with the World Bank Institute, will be used to facilitate the national debate 
on economic reform and to disseminate domestic and international experience. (World 
Bank, 2001, p. 44) 
As a result of the Bank’s thematic and sectoral studies, conducted officially as Analytical and Advisory 
Activities (AAA), the World Bank, which had been the largest donor to India since the 1950s on 
different water projects, produced two reports on water use in India: the Irrigation Sector Review 
(1991) and the Water Resources Management Policy (1993). The reports highlighted that severe 
organizational and instructional problems persisted in India’s management of water despite the country 
having adopted the National Water Policy (1987). Realizing that project-by-project assistance did not 
work and that project-based loans had become simply an exercise in monetary disbursement, the Bank 
decided to switch from providing project-based loans to sector-based loans to help India better and 
more effectively manage the distribution of its water. The reports emphasized that water in India is a 
“scarce commodity” and argued that “the scarcity value of water” must be reflected in water policy 
charges. The 1993 report advocated for the reduced role of the government in water management and 
recommended that the government shift from being the sole provider and financier of water to acting 
as a facilitator, enabler, or regulator of water usage. The past failures of the state governments to 
adequately deal with the challenges of quality and quantity of available water only further highlighted 
the need for the very sort of new thinking that the Bank was prescribing: the implementation of 
“sustainable water resources management.” Proposing institutional strengthening and reorganization, 
the reports advocated a shift from a supply-driven approach to a demand-driven approach with an 
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appropriate framework to separate policy and regulatory functions from operations. The Bank 
advocated the need for change based on “poverty alleviation,” claiming that “the poor are much better 
off when water is managed as an economic good” (Briscoe, 1996, p. 3). 
 Another report Water Resource Management Sector Review was undertaken in 1998 and was 
the result of a partnership between the Government of India and the World Bank, along with the 
governments of the United Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands (World Bank, 1999a, p. ix). 
Although called a “partnership effort,” it was an initiative of the World Bank as the synthesis report 
pointed out: 
The review was commenced and sustained under the leadership of Heinz Vergin (Department 
Director), Robert Drysdale (subsequent department Director), and Edwin Lim (India Country 
Director); John Williamson (South Asia Chief Economist); Shawki Bargouti (Division Chief), 
succeeded by Michael Baxter and Ridwan Ali (Sector Managers-Rural Development) and 
Frannie Humplick. (World Bank, 1999a, p. x) 
All the people mentioned above were World Bank officials. The overall team leaders for the mission 
and report preparation were also from the World Bank. The 1998 report recommended that the Indian 
government oversee water resource management, address current and future inter-sectoral needs, and 
provide support for the institutional development and reform of water management in a way that was 
consistent with the Bank’s policy. The Bank also put out a series of publications in 1990s that stressed 
the development of capital markets for resource mobilization, facilitating private-and joint-sector 
projects using Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) to enhance efficiency (“Reducing Poverty in India,” 
1998; “India: Urban Infrastructure,” 1996, 1997; “Urban Water Supply,” 1998). The goal of the Bank 
was thus to reduce monopolies while supporting infrastructure development, particularly water market 
mechanisms. 
 In its assessment, the World Bank advocated for the “unbundling” (a term first used by 
neoclassical economists) of certain segments of Indian industry so as to permit authentic competition 
from alternative sources. The Bank endorsed the idea, saying, “By isolating the natural monopoly 
segments of an industry, unbundling promotes new entry and competition in segments that are 
potentially competitive” (World Bank, 1994, p. 53). All three reports compiled by the World Bank 
regarding India’s water management emphasized the need for reforms in the water sector to fill 
deficiencies, provide services, and improve the overall management and performance of the sector 
(Singh, 2004, p. 60).  The experts who conducted these reviews were World Bank Officials, 
Bureaucratic officials from the Ministry of Urban Development and Ministry of Water Resources, or 
transnational consultants from different parts of the world that drew on their international experiences 
to justify a program that was, in essence, about the commodification of water. 
Bilateral agencies like Department for International Development (DFID) of the UK, United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) of the USA, Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) of Germany, and (OECF) Overseas Economic Cooperation 
Fund of Japan also moved into various water management projects and policy issues relating to the 
management of drinking water, sanitation, and irrigation in India at the national and subnational level. 
Couching their bids for involvement in the language of offers of technological assistance, these 
agencies continue to make inroads into Indian policy space to generate markets for the entry of their 
own multinational corporations under public-private partnerships. These agencies have worked toward 
providing market access for their domestic corporations to carry out studies to construct and operate 
water treatment plants (Shiva 2005). Most also provided consultants to assess the “efficiency” and 
“cost-effectiveness” of various water management schemes.  





In 2001, another player, the Asian Development Bank another external agency9 (ADB), 
announced its water policy, which focused on expanding water services delivery through autonomous 
and accountable service providers, private-sector participation, and public-private partnerships. The 
policy aimed to reallocate water through “markets of transferable water rights” and stressed that the 
state governments needs to modify its role from “one of service provider to regulator” (ADB, 2001). 
Under its broad aim of “poverty reduction in urban areas,” ADB moved into the Indian states of 
Karnataka, Rajasthan, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Sikkim through its country assistance plans, 
which intensified private sector participation. The process of introducing the state governments to the 
role of the private sector in water management continues at an unprecedented pace. Already some 
thirty cities in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, and Rajasthan are bidding the management, 
treatment or distribution of their respective municipal water supplies to a handful of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) among civil society protests10.  
 
The Role of Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
 
Another actor in the networks is the Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF), a 
multi-donor agency managed by the World Bank that aims to help developing countries improve the 
quality of their infrastructure through private sector involvement. Among the different forms of 
assistance provided by the PPIAF, a category of assistance that it has provided for India has been 
“consensus building” (Dharmadhikary, 2008, p. 33), or the intentional spreading of a particular notion 
among local populations regarding management of water. The information was presented in a manner 
so as to build a form agreement amongst the populace of private sector involvement in water as a best 
practices case. Consensus building was to be achieved by (a) organizing workshops and other training 
programs for journalists in the environment, (b) creating PPPs, and (c) conducting public-sector 
reform, all of which was done in order to disseminate information about the relevance of the policies of 
the international financial agencies or other actors. One of the ways consensus building worked was 
through the launch of the Water Policy Reform Initiative, a major initiative where consultative 
workshop of policymakers and stakeholders were held on October 31, 2000, with a grant of 
US$ 520,000 by the PPIAF and US$ 430,000 from co-donors like the World Bank and the Swedish 
Assistance International (SAIN). The objective of the Water Policy Reform Initiative was to alleviate 
poverty by building consensus among the different networks in the national and state governments on 
water sector reform in India and to strengthen the capacity of decision makers and stakeholders to 
prepare and implement reforms leading to increased private sector participation in the water sector. The 
initiative also intended to (a) promote knowledge sharing on reform and institutional development for 
improved sector performance and, ultimately, (b) better meet the needs of the urban poor—through 
greater awareness of the rationale as a best practices case in such reform (PPIAF Report 2003). 
To achieve these objectives, the initiative relied on three key elements: 
1. Policy dialogue: This dialogue consisted of policy seminars for state-level decision 
makers and stakeholders focusing on the main barriers to reform. The goal was to 
promote consensus at the state level for policy reform, as indicated by the outputs and 
declarations produced by workshops, seminars, and presentations (Urban Water and 
Sanitation Sector Reform Workshop—Piloting Private Sector Participation in Mega 
Cities; Twelfth Urban Think Tank on Tariffs, Subsidies, and the Poor in the Indian 
Water Sector; International Conference on New Perspectives on Water for Urban and 
Rural India; Private Sector Participation in Urban Water and Sanitation Services: 
Managing the Process and Regulating the Sector). 
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2. Public Awareness: This awareness was generated as a result of information seminars for 
journalists and members of civil society, which were organized to influence public 
opinion, as measured by the number and quality of articles and other media reports 
following journalist workshops and the advocacy efforts undertaken by think tanks and 
nongovernmental organizations. The initiative organized “Running Water: A Dialogue 
for Journalists” to build an informed press to improve coverage of the water sector. A 
seminar organized on February 7-8, 2000 resulted in the publication of only success 
stories, presented from international experiences. Moreover, the report stated: 
More than 200 delegates from Centre, States, municipal authorities, private 
sector and bilateral and multilateral agencies attended the seminar to discuss 
presentations on the international and Indian experience on the use of private 
sector to assist in the financing and managing of water supply and sanitation 
investments. Nearly 40 experts of international agencies/private operators 
attended the seminar. In fact, out of the total 134 participants, 44 were from state 
governments and municipalities, 27 from central government, 41 international 
and 22 from the World Bank. The program showed that over half the 
presentations were made by the private water industry and the World Bank. 
(Dharmadhikary, 2008, p. 35) 
3. Knowledge product production and dissemination of knowledge products: To support 
the initiative, “knowledge product” was developed in the form of a series of tariff and 
subsidy papers and household surveys in selected cities. The papers were distributed to 
relevant policy makers, service providers, and other stakeholders in India and the rest of 
the region. These reports were posted on the Ministry of Urban Development websites 
for like-minded states and local utilities to have easy access to the information (PPIAF 
Report, October, 2003). 
Through these workshops, dialogues, and publication of reports, the international financial agencies 
backing the Water Policy Reform Initiative were able to disseminate a particular form of knowledge 
that was targeted towards a specific goal, thereby feeding into the state environmentality11 and 
promoting a hegemonic form of knowledge about water. The most important achievement of the Bank 
during this period was the way in which it deepened its institutional understanding of the bureaucracy, 
polity, and biases that plague the political economy of water management at the national and sub-
national levels. Understanding the political, socio-psychological, and cultural dimension of water in 
India, the Bank began to champion the cause of private-sector participation, albeit couched in the 
discourses of “crisis, scarcity, poverty alleviation, and statistics.”  These discourses and internal 
liberalization measures in India led to the official publication of important policy documents regarding 
private-sector participation in the management of water reflecting a the shift in the government  agenda  
in the early years of the twenty-first century. 
 
The Role of International Consultants 
 
The other piece of the network in water knowledge production has been the role of 
international consultants on whom a lot of these external agencies, corporations and donors depend.  
These are higly paid people based on their “superior expertise but without any grounded knowledge of 
the local conditions.” These are groups of experts living in Geneva, Sweden, Washington, etc. 
Consultants hired by these international financial agencies conduct water sector reviews in India’s 
water sector, including project preparation studies, implementation studies, and research studies and 





“surveys.” Consultants are used by the bank  and other external agencies at every step of the 
knowledge creation process. Consultants generate the numbers and statistics to strengthen data to gain 
legitimacy for the approach of donor agencies and the state. “The [World Bank] thought that the 
important knowledge was ‘the brain on the plane’: the bank officer or consultant who flew into a 
country to give locals the benefit of their superior expertise” (Wolfensohn, 2003, cited in 
Dharmadhikary, 2008, p. 43). Major consultants working in the water sector in India include Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, (GKW), and Halcrow. Specifically, GKW, Trilegal, and Cure were hired by the 
Delhi Water Board for the Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Project to draw up specific terms of 
contracts for private players and do a social and environmental assessment of the water supply in the 
city (Parivartan, 2004.) The Bank and the other donors have supported the justification of private 
sector participation by “research studies” and “surveys” conducted by these consultants who are 
commissioned by them and are highly paid by these agencies. For example in India, the reports 
conducted by consultants reaffirm water scarcity, inefficiency, cost recovery, poverty alleviation 
through  private sector participation, and the effective implementation of water solutions at the local 
level in the state-backed consultancy-based projects. For example, in the case of the Madhya Pradesh 
Water Restructuring Project and the Delhi Water Supply and Sewerage Project,12 the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) and the WB ensured that the consultants chosen by the states were those 
whose reports were in line with the Bank’s ideology. 
 
Actors on the National Scale 
 
The structural adjustment program of the World Bank and IMF as well as the political 
leadership’s questioning some of the earlier assumptions of economic development, initiated a process 
of critical thinking that led to an influential—even transformative—debate on development policy in 
India (Shastri, 1997, p. 3).  While the transformation was not achieved under one administration, ideas, 
once introduced, assume power of their own, and find the conduits through which they can flow and 
gain momentum lasting longer than any one administration (Shastri, 1997; Nayar, 2001). Key 
constituents of the process of transformation constituted the so-called “lateral agents” in the economic 
process. The political environment in the mid-1980s provided the policy space for these “laterals” to 
come in and recommend that political incumbents adopt new ideas about different policy options. The 
laterals were primarily educated in the United Kingdom or the United States, had diverse career 
backgrounds, and maintained international networks.  In spite of acting in an advisory capacity in 
India, they were and are constantly in touch with the international networks and institutions from 
which the discourses of liberalization evolved. In between their stints as advisors to the government, 
they attend workshops,   trainings, and/or occupy positions in networks of neoliberal organizations like 
the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Washington DC think tanks.  
These advisors were mainly appointed from outside the bureaucracy and brought with them a set of 
ideas from their own experience and from the neoliberal thinking that pervaded the networks in which 
they operated.  These individuals forged the link between the space of the conference rooms of 
globalist entities/ free-market think tanks  in which these new ideas and interests were incubated  and 
the space within the government where their ideas could shape the policy-making process and 
ultimately be implemented. 
These policy advisors—also known as the “Change Team” (Waterbury, 1990, p. 191) and the 
“policy entrepreneurs” (Keeley & Scoones, 1999, p. 21)—forged the link between the adoption of new 
ideas and interests and the policy process through which such ideas could be implemented. Essentially, 
the members of this pivotal “Change Team” were able to see policy spaces opening up and respond to 
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“trigger” events or “focusing events” when they arose (Cobb & Elder, 1972; Kingdon, 1984); their role 
was critical to the process of knowledge production  that actually began in the 1990s. 
 
 
The Role of Change Team 
 
The Change Team in India comprised both political and bureaucratic members, most of whom 
were either educated in the West or had gone on deputation posting and trainings and were exposed to 
Western ideas of liberalism and the market process (Shastri, 1997).  Both the career politicians and 
lateral bureaucratic elites played a crucial role in the early phase of the liberalization process in India. 
The bureaucrats are generally politically insulated and not directly accountable to the electorate. 
Politicians and members of politics must normally face their electorates and, therefore, often claim to 
base policy announcements on controversial issues on the “expert opinions” of the lateral bureaucratic 
elites or “policy entrepreneurs.” Therefore, the bureaucrats were in a better position than the politicians 
to push policy reforms without direct confrontation from the electorate. 
From their protected position, these elites were able to continue their work from Rajiv Gandhi’s 
administration: writing policy papers and committee reports detailing the sequence of the liberalization 
process, while political actors came and went  in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi’s assassination in 1991. 
When Narsimha Rao became prime minister in July 1991, India was in desperate need of financial 
help, and a substantial loan was a matter of necessity rather than choice.  In a strategic move, Rao 
appointed Man Mohan Singh,13 an outsider to the ruling Congress Party and a long-term critic of 
India’s export pessimism, as finance minister. His appointment was part of Rao’s strategy to 
demonstrate continuity with previous policy, as well as to inspire IMF confidence regarding India’s 
willingness and commitment to undertake structural adjustment programs (Dash 1999, 900). Singh’s 
reputation as a neutral and effective financial manager during his previous appointment as governor of 
Reserve Bank of India and secretary of Ministry of Finance had earned him respect from all political 
parties. Thus, in Rao’s calculation, Singh’s initiatives for economic reform would not be subject to 
immediate partisan pressure, giving the minority government a critical breathing space to mobilize 
support for the reform. Singh was also well acquainted with Michael Camdessus (Director General of 
the IMF),14 with which the Rao government was negotiating. Singh inducted prominent lateral Montek 
Singh Ahluwalia as his finance secretary. Both Singh and Ahluwalia planted “their men,” all of whom 
had extensive World Bank or IMF experience, in most ministries (Dash 1999, 900), and this move 
helped establish a technocratic alignment between Indian bureaucracy and international financial 
agencies—a crucial nexus in the network of liberalization advocates. 
Prominent among the bureaucrats of the civil services who played a major role in the reform 
process were A.N. Verma. Abid Hussain, Gopi Arora, S.Venkataramanan, S. Ganeshan, and others. The 
foreign experiences and exposures of the bureaucrats in top positions in the West enabled them to 
critically compare India to other nations rather than comparing India’s present-day achievements to 
those of earlier decades.  On the basis of their experiences abroad, they were able to apply a global 
perspective to the policy recommendations and frame new policies that arose out of a critical 
exploration of the process of economic development (Shastri, 1997). As a result, a consensus began to 
emerge within the bureaucracy that a liberalization agenda was imperative. 
 While there were many lateral advisors to the reform process, two prominent figures, Montek 
Singh Ahluwalia and Rakesh Mohan, are especially important in the context of economic liberalization 
processes and infrastructure development. Both held key positions in the World Bank and the IMF as 
well as in the finance ministries, planning commission, and the prime minister’s office and have 





chaired several committees since 1979. Rakesh Mohan chaired the Expert Committee on 
Commercialization of Infrastructure: For Growth and Welfare, whose scope included water supply and 
sanitation (1994–1996). This committee made strong recommendations for private-sector participation 
in water supply and sanitation due to inefficiency, lack of economic recovery, and poverty alleviation. 
Mr. Ahluwalia worked at the IMF before being invited by the Finance Minister, Man Mohan Singh 
(current prime minister) to join as Finance Secretary in his department. He currently retains the 
position of the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission under Prime Minister Man Mohan 
Singh, who is its chairman. It was during these developments that the National Water Resources 
Council in the Ministry of Water Resources met to review the National Water Policy of 1987 and 
adopted a new water policy for India in 2002 in view of the larger changes in the Indian economy. The 
2002 water policy marked a departure from the 1987 policy in that it laid emphasis on the socio-
economic aspects of water policy planning and the needs of the states. Changes in water policy reform 
seemed to be imperative. Narsalay (2003, p. 3) sums up the state of this reform process, saying, 
“Internationally, as ‘economies’ started eating into the space of societies and as different elements of 
the structural adjustment programs started gaining political acceptance as the only macroeconomic 
answer to achieve developmental goals, a strong political pitch started being made even in India with 
respect to issues in realm of ownership and rights, over natural resources including water.” 
 
Role of Institutions in the State 
 
With the National Water Policy in place, institutional networks like the Ministry of Urban 
Development (2002) went ahead in making major changes to allow 100 percent Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) in urban infrastructure projects. This investment included development of water 
supply sources, water distribution, billing, sewage reclamation and reuse, management of 
unaccounted-for water, manufacture of water supply equipment, and privatization of solid-waste 
management systems.  The central government offered special incentives for investments such as 
exemption from customs and excise duties on imported machinery and exemption from all taxes for 
the first five years of water and sewerage projects (Rajamani, 2004). The government provided these 
fiscal incentives to encourage partnership with the private sector and attract foreign investment in 
urban water supply and sanitation projects. It further amended the municipal acts to enable urban local 
bodies to partner with the private sector and improve governance and management (Rajamani, 2004). 
 A series of reports, presentations, and bureaucratic trips to Washington DC followed, pursuing 
and advocating policies for public-private partnerships in water supplies and sanitation. India’s 
commitment to reaching the UN’s Millennium Development Goals by 2015 shows that estimated 
investments in water supplies would be approximately Rs. 96 billion (2015) and 258 billion (2025) 
(IAR 2002, 54). These statistics constitute part of the Planning Commission’s Report on India 
Assessment Water, funded by the WHO–UNICEF. That stated: 
If India’s aspirations for continued economic growth and improved social and 
environmental conditions are to be met, fundamental changes in how water is allocated, 
planned and managed must occur. The currently ongoing reform process in Rural Water 
Supply and Sanitation and Urban water Supply and Sanitation and New National Water 
and Health Policies are important steps in the right directions. These should be 
sustained, and where necessary, augmented by further reform measures. (IA 2002, 11) 
The report mentioned that the supply-side approach to water has resulted in major economic, social, 
and environmental costs and emphasized a demand-management policy. Highlighting the policy 
objectives of the urban water supplies sector, including universal coverage, adequacy and regularity of 
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water supply, and avoidance of excessive withdrawal leading to depletion, the report detailed the urban 
water problems that relate to cities in India. Poor quality of transmission and distribution networks, 
physical losses of water ranging from 25 to 50 percent, low pressures leading to back siphoning, which 
result in contamination, and water availability ranging from two to eight hours a day find mention in 
the report.15 The report’s recommended policy strategies included (a) decentralization, (b) 
corporatization and commercialization of existing institutions, (c), enhancement of technical and 
managerial capabilities, (d) the unbundling of functions of ULBs, (e) Institutional restructuring, (f) the 
changing the role of government from provider to regulator and facilitator, (g) appropriate forms of 
private participation and (h) public-private partnership in the form of service contracts, leases, and 
concessions, like Build Own and Operate (BOO),  and Build Own, Operate and Transfer (BOOT), etc., 
to be facilitated, (i) water pricing based on volumetric pricing, and (j) the transition from state 
monopolies to competition (IA 2002, p. 56). 
From global policy networks to national networks, a consensus emerged by 1998 among the 
political and bureaucratic elite for the need for Public Private Partnerships (PPPs).  A working group 
with representations from select ministries and the Planning Commission was first set up in the prime 
minister’s office in January 2002. This group brought out a concept paper on PPPs in June 2003, 
leading to the Planning Commission’s report in November 2004. The report conceded that PPP is a 
relevant business model but maintained that such a model should be introduced in different sectors 
with adequate understanding (Report on PPP in Social Sector, November 2004, p. i). The report also 
emphasized that PPPs lead to improvement in both “efficiency” and “effectiveness” in services. 
 
The Role of Businesses 
 
Apart from policy entrepreneurs, a major actor in the network that supported a market 
mechanism in infrastructure development (in this case water) was the involvement and the support of 
the Indian business industry. At the Indian Economic Summit in New Delhi, held from November 27 to 
29, 2005, the Indian Business Alliance on Water (IBAW) was launched with the support and 
partnership of the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), the United Nation Development Project 
(UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Economic 
Forum, and Prem Durai Exports-Switcher. The alliance was intended to facilitate the development of 
PPPs in water projects, broaden business-sector engagement in the commercial water projects, and 
promote corporate best practices in water. CII, with the collaboration of the World Economic Forum 
Water Initiative, hosted the water summit for PPPs in water and watershed management with the aim 
of bringing the latest trends, technologies, and best practices to Indian industry (CII Water Summit, 
Press Release, November 26-27, 2005 Delhi). In the words of Richard Samans, MD, of the World 
Economic Forum: 
India is facing significant challenges regarding water access and quality, and the 
business community can be an important part of the solution by improving water 
management, efficiency, and working in closer partnerships with communities and 
municipalities. The Indian Business Alliance with communities has the potential to 
make contributions in this respect and the WEF is pleased to support it. (Press Release, 
WEF November 29, 2005) 
 The assessment reports of the government of India, the business alliance in the water 
initiative, and the policies of international financial institutions like the World Bank and the 
Asian Development Bank reiterated their commitment to private-sector participation in water 
resources. The World Bank Water Resources Sector Strategy (WRSS) (2003) claimed that 





water utility reform usually means substantial benefits for the poor and makes the water sector 
attractive to private investors. The Asian Development Bank’s Water Policy, approved in 2001, 
seeks to promote water as a socially vital economic good that needs careful management to 
sustain equitable economic growth and reduce poverty (Asian Development Bank, 2001). 
Vigorously advocating the entry of private players into the water supply chain in India, the  
World Bank’s report on “India’s Water Economy: Bracing for a Turbulent Future” (November, 
2005)  also argued that the presence of private players is essential, as there existed no civic 
body in the country that could provide water supply 24 hours a day.   
The terms “decentralization,” “unbundling,” “management,” “technology, “economic 
efficiency,” “poverty alleviation,” and “sustainability” recurred consistently in almost every actor's 
report and also signify an apparent link between the reports produced by international and financial 
agencies, government  policy documents, and the ideas and discourse of the elite and of external 
support agencies. A careful reading of the various policy documents of the multiscalar networks 
revealed a fairly coherent and interconnected set of ideas that seem to transcend national political 
boundaries.  These were 
1. India was facing a serious water crisis that needed to be urgently managed within a 
  historic timeframe.  
2. Water policy reform is essential for development, economic growth, good governance, 
  and access to water for the poor, who suffer the consequences of poor water  
  management, the most. 
3. Poorly designed fiscal policies and governance constraints have further lessened access 
  to urban water supplies by the people.  
4. The economic value of water needs to be recognized as the failure to charge people the 
  use cost to reflect the true cost of water has inculcated a culture of wastefulness, leading 
  to crisis and scarcity of water. 
5. Consequently, ensuring universal coverage and regularity of water supplies in a  
  developing country like India not only requires economic instruments and private-sector 
  participation but devolution of administrative responsibilities (decentralization) and 
  public-private partnerships.  
The Planning Commission, the Ministry of Water Resources, and the Ministry of Urban Development 
all endorsed and continue to endorse the increased participation of the private sector in India’s water 
management. All these agencies focused on a policy design that recommended private-sector 
participation, technological innovation, economic and institutional reform for universal coverage, and 
efficiency and sustainability of water resources. These design recommendations also expose the 
influence that the concept of “economic efficiency” has come to occupy in developmentalist thinking 
in India and the manner in which policies have been formulated to achieve water sector reforms. 
In India, this process of implementing these recommendations was facilitated gradually, at a 
time when the key challenge for the government was balancing the domestic interests of the 
constituencies with the conditions of the external agencies. The structural linkages between 
bureaucrats, politicians, external forces, and well-qualified economists (some of them with extensive 
work experience and a thorough grasp of the structural power of international financial institutions like 
the IMF and the World Bank) created the opportunities to push forward these reforms through private 
sector participation. This idea of reform gained ascendancy in the national agenda through the 
authority exercised by the key circle of policymakers with strong political support and the political and 
economic imperatives managed by the Bank. Under a neoliberal vision of poverty alleviation and 
ecological sustainability, a consensus emerged in the corridors of the government that the new political 
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rationale of development promoted by external financial agencies in which private-sector participation 
in water issues is essential, was the approach best able to serve India and resolve its issues of water 
management. An overall climate was conducive to allowing these agencies and the MNCs to pressure 
states to liberalize, privatize, and globalize in their facilitation and implementation of water 
management (LPG). 
The states proceeded to incorporate changes in the state water provisions because of the 
developments that occurred on the national scene and enhance state capacities to sustain the nationally-
backed approaches and programs. These approaches included the heightened role of international 
agencies, the resolving of states’ financial problems (mainly as a result of cuts in social spending by 
the national governments) and the political interests of state politicians (who wished to demonstrate 
their “progressiveness” with respect to the development of new state run projects). Politicians in 
Maharashtra, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, and Madhya Pradesh added the 




In the post-reform era, water began to be seen as part of the new economy and access to water 
and effective management of water was constructed as the essential commodity necessary for a good 
life, sustainable development, and poverty alleviation. Framing water as a development problem 
allowed the solution (i.e. development through economic growth facilitated by capital investment in 
technological expertise in water infrastructure) to be presented as a self-evident truth defined in purely 
technical, politically neutral terms.  The promotion of particular technical approaches functioning in 
essence as a Foucaldian “political technology” lent further persuasiveness to an “expert science” policy 
discourse that left less room for opposition and hid the political intent of leaders and politicians. These 
changing constructions of water framed by TPNs, business-science elite, shaped India’s water reform 
policy in terms of an essentially economic and technological discourse.  By promulgating stories that 
invite specific intervention, those in power had the ability to create frames of reference that defined 
what forms of knowledge count and whose versions, claims, and interests are legitimate.  These 
legitimized forms of knowledge often act as drivers of advocacy of particular policy instruments.   
An elite network of policymakers dominates the post-reform era. As the power of the expertise 
of the elites came to underpin development policies, knowledge of some groups of development actors 
(e.g., the PWC consultants and the World Bank) came to be defined as fundamentally more valid than 
the knowledge of others.  The continuity in the ideologies of the policy networks was evident from the 
way water was ultimately framed in narratives and taken up in discourses surrounding it. An effort has 
been made by the government to replicate the global ideologies in India’s local practices. Different 
narratives about science, technology, and public-private partnerships emerged out of particular contexts 
and conditions.  In the case of India, these narratives emerged from networks of globalized 
connections, multinational corporations, and the political positioning of the central government and the 
Congress coalition, which operate outside of the realm of democratic politics.  
Constructed narratives, which often define both the assumed problem and the proposed 
solutions in neat, appealing story lines (cf. Roe, 1991), were promulgated through key actors and their 
proposed networks. In discerning the complexity and tracking of the dynamics of policy processes, this 
paper highlighted the institutional, global, political, and business connections at work in the 
formulation of urban water policy in India and revealed the interchange between local settings and 
global processes.  The dominance of the World Bank’s knowledge was accomplished through these 
professionals and networks that it draws upon from research institutions, think tanks, and academia. 





The TPNs exerted pressure on the states environmentality in a way that promotes role of market 
mechanism in water management. The partnership between the state, IFIs, and the private sector with 
the backing of experts was hailed as the new model for policymaking, opening up a scientifically 
supported, economically sound set of polices by those who knew best.   
  The global to local policy process has been strongly resented in democratic societies, as the 
voices of the people that produce alternative policy networks16 become “lost in the corridors of power.” 
The reform process in India regarding its water management relied on production of knowledge by 
elite networks of power. It was through these transnational networks that water discourse was 
normalized and adopted using knowledge production policies that govern water distribution and 
management in the cities of India. Consultants, corporate interests, external agencies, and the 
bureaucracy penetrated into the state system in India with respect to its water management, and 
knowledge produced by these elite networks acquired legitimacy, excluding and marginalizing other 
forms of knowledge. 
                                                 
1 This term by Foucault relates to the way policy is often “depoliticized” if such depoliticization is in the interest of the 
dominant group. A political problem is removed from the realm of political discourse and recast in the neutral language of 
science and is represented as objective, neutral, and value-free. This depoliticization reflects the “technology of politics” by 
which various means are used to work within a political agenda; in this way, the “masking of the political under the cloak of 
neutrality is a key feature of modern power” (Shore & Wright, 1997). 
2 The term global governance is used to designate all regulations intended for organization and centralization of human 
societies on a global scale. 
3  There are competing values attached to water based on differing interests and perspectives. However, “Over the last 20 
years no global water policy meeting has neglected to pass a resolution which, among others, defined water as an 
‘economic good’” (Wolf, 2003, 174). 
4 In the 1980s, highly indebted developing regions were unable to repay their debts. To counter this, macroeconomic 
tightening and "structural adjustment" (liberalization and privatization) were administered, often through the conditionality 
of the IMF and the World Bank. This resolution of this crisis involved long-term commercial bank debt, which the 
governments of developing countries were unable to repay, making financial rescue operations necessary. 
5 However, it is also argued that this recognition of water as a public good with only social value has led to a culture of 
wastefulness of water which needs to be corrected through cost recovery and economic pricing of water. 
6Neoliberalism is the defining political and economic paradigm of contemporary times. It refers to a set of policies and 
processes that emphasize deregulation and reduction of state control and highlights that notion that economic growth and 
social justice are best maintained by minimal government interference and free market forces. 
7  India suffered a balance of payment crisis in 1991. The trade deficit resulted due to the Gulf War with India’s import bill 
increasing, decreasing exports and lack of credit leading to fiscal imbalance and trade deficits. India’s foreign exchange 
reserves were reduced a few weeks of imports and its gold was airlifted for collateral International Monetary Fund Loan. 
India was close to a default. 
8 Country Assistance Strategy is a comprehensive document drawn by external agencies like the World Bank or Asian 
Development Bank and or/other partners that details the development challenges faced by a country and identifies the key 
areas of intervention where these agencies can make a difference through assistance. These CAS take into account the 
country’s creditworthiness, its institutional development and governance capacity and other sectors. The agencies then 
determine the level of technical, advisory or financial support the country needs.              
9 ADB is an organization founded in 1966 that aims in its mission to improve people’s lives in Asia and the Pacific. It 
works through investment in infrastructure, health care services, financial and public administration systems through loans, 
policy dialogue and technical assistance. 
10 Protests have arisen as there is a belief in civil society that the involvement of the private sector compromises the social 
value of water making it a commodity and it compromises issues of equity and social justice. Another reason for resistance 
to such projects is the lack of transparency and accountability when dealing with MNCs and external agencies.  
11 Environmentality is about government agencies that work with producers of expert knowledge to construct the 
environment –in this case water. By internalization of knowledge/power among the different actors a decentered network is 
created whose interests are integrated with the state. 
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12 The DJB approached the World Bank (WB) in 1998 for a loan. The Bank’s team visited the Board in July 1998, and the 
Bank suggested they hire a consultant who would "suggest" basic reforms for the DJB to carry out.  The Bank offered a 
US$2.5 million loan to DJB to hire a consultant. The loan carried an interest rate of twice the amount the government 
would have to pay if it raised the money from the internal market. (Parivartan, 2004). The process of awarding the contract 
was finalized in complete secrecy when reports appeared in the media of the WB’s intervention in ensuring that the contract 
was finally awarded to Pricewaterhouse Cooper (PwC) a Rs 7 crore (US$ 1.6 million) consultancy contract in November 
2001. 
13 Singh was economic advisor to the National Front government in 1990 when the IMF loan to India was sanctioned and 
conditionalities initiated.  
14 In Singh’s term as secretary general of the South Commission in Geneva in the late 1980s, Singh and Michael Camdessus 
(director general of the IMF) participated in several meetings in which they shared a similar philosophy about the positive 
impact of pro-market strategies on India’s economy. 
15 These are relevant issues needing attention but their solutions are contested. 
16  Networks of resistance also emerged to contest the policy reform. They are not discussed here as the focus is on 
networks of power. 
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